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CRONY CAPITALISM AND ANTITRUST
Maurice E. Stucke*	
  
Civil antitrust in the United States recently awoke from its years of
slumber.

In August, the United States brought a landmark lawsuit to

prevent the merger of two of the nation’s four largest mobile wireless
telecommunications services providers, AT&T Inc. and T‑Mobile USA,
Inc.1 After prosecuting Intel, the Federal Trade Commission is currently
investigating Google for monopolistic abuses. And the U.S. Senate antitrust
subcommittee recently joined the fray in questioning Google’s CEO.2
Although antitrust’s resurgence is welcomed,3 it is especially
welcomed by lobbyists. For example, before its antitrust headaches,
Microsoft devoted little energy to lobbying efforts. As the Washington Post
commented, “For a couple of embarrassing years in the mid-1990s,
Microsoft’s primary lobbying presence was ‘Jack and his Jeep’ — Jack
Krumholz, the software giant’s lone in-house lobbyist, who drove a Jeep
Grand Cherokee to lobbying visits.”4

After the United States filed its

*

Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow,
American Antitrust Institute. The author was also an attorney at the U.S. Department of
Justice Antitrust Division. The author wishes to thank Albert Foer, Don Leatherman, and
Roger Noll for their helpful comments.
1
Compl., United States v. AT&T, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 1:11-cv-01560-ESH (D.D.C.
Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f274600/274613.htm.
2
The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition? Hearing
Before Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy &
Consumer
Rights
(Sept.
21,
2011),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba64d93cb
.
3
Some are disappointed in the Obama administration’s otherwise lackluster antitrust
efforts. They would like to see more civil enforcement before characterizing the recent
activity as a revival or resurgence.
4
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Learning From Microsoft’s Error, Google Builds a Lobbying
Engine, WASH. POST, June 20, 2007, at D1. Lobbyists have sought to influence antitrust
decisions for years. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1446-56 (2009). If anything is new (starting with Microsoft),
observed Bert Foer, it is probably the fairly standard retention in large antitrust cases of
public relation firms and media strategists, who have an easier time in the absence of a
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antitrust lawsuit in 1998, Microsoft quickly built up its government-affairs
office. Microsoft now spends millions of dollars annually on lobbying.5
Thus it is not surprising that Google currently is spending even more
on lobbying (over $2 million alone between April and June 2011).6
Likewise, AT&T and T-Mobile increased their lobbying efforts during the
antitrust review of their merger.7 AT&T spent $11.69 million in the first six
months of 2011.8 It also lobbied lawmakers with $52 steaks and $15 ginand-cucumber puree cocktails.9
And amid AT&T and T-Mobile’s lobbying effort comes a letter from
fifteen Democratic lawmakers, led by Congressman Heath Shuler, to
President Barack Obama.

They “urge the Administration to resolve

expeditiously your concerns and approve the proposed merger between
AT&T and T-Mobile USA.”10 Likewise one hundred Republican House of
dedicated and expert antitrust media.
5
Center for Responsive Politics, Heavy Hitters, Microsoft Corp.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?cycle=A&type=P&id=D000000115 (last
visited Sept. 29, 2011) (“Between 2000 and 2010, Microsoft spent at least $6 million each
year on federal lobbying efforts.”).
6
Michael Liedtke, Google’s Lobbying Bill Tops Previous Record, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 21, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/googles-lobbying-bill-q22011_n_906149.html.
7
Simon Maloy, The AT&T/T-Mobile Lobbyist Army, MediaMatters, Aug. 2, 2011,
http://mediamatters.org/blog/201108020022 (noting how T-Mobile “increased its lobbying
expenditures from $602,000 in the second quarter of 2010 to $1 million in second quarter
of 2011”).
8
Center
for
Responsive
Politics,
Heavy
Hitters,
AT&T
Inc.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?cycle=A&type=P&id=D000000076 (last
visited Sept. 29, 2011). Sprint has been lobbying to oppose the merger, spending nearly $2
million in 2011. Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying, Sprint Nextel,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000179 (last visited Oct. 2,
2011).
9
Jonathan D. Salant & Todd Shields, $52 Steaks on Menu as AT&T Feted Lawmakers
During T-Mobile, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 2, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0902/-52-steaks-on-menu-as-at-t-feted-lawmakers-during-t-mobile-push.html.
10
Press Release, Rep. Heath Shuler, Rep. Shuler Urges Obama Administration to
Settle Proposed AT&T/T-Mobile USA Merger (Sept. 15, 2011), available at
http://shuler.house.gov/2011/09/rep-shuler-urges-obama-administration-to-settle-proposedattt-mobile-usa-merger.shtml. The other signatories were Representatives John Barrow,
Mike Ross, Dan Boren, Dennis Cardoza, Joe Baca, Leonard Boswell, Ben Chandler, Jim
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Representatives members, led by Congressman Pete Olson, urged President
Obama to intercede in the Department of Justice’s lawsuit to force a
settlement.11 Republican Congressman Pete Sessions went even further.
He called the AT&T lawsuit “the latest example of the Obama
Administration’s continued assault on the American economy” and the
Administration’s “continued commitment to preventing and impeding job
growth at every opportunity.”12
These are unusual statements about a proposed merger that reduces the
number of national competitors from 4 to 3 in an already highly
concentrated industry.

The merger, as we discuss elsewhere13, is

presumptively anticompetitive and illegal. AT&T and T-Mobile in their
public submissions have failed to overcome that presumption. The
American Antitrust Institute, among others, likewise has found that the
merger violates section 7 of the Clayton Act.14
So why are so many elected officials asking the DOJ to approve a
merger that would likely lead to higher prices, fewer jobs, less innovation,
and higher excise taxes (to the extent the taxes are based on higher cost of
services) for their constituents? AT&T was Representative Shuler’s second

Costa, Henry Cuellar, Mike McIntyre, Mike Michaud, Collin Peterson, Loretta Sanchez,
and David Scott.
11
Letter from Rep. Pete Olson et al. to President Barack Obama (Sept. 20, 2011),
available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/sept-20-house-gop-letter-supporting-atttakeover-t.
12
Rep. Pete Sessions, Statement in Response to the Justice Department’s Lawsuit to
Prevent AT&T Merger with T-Mobile (Aug. 31, 2011), available at
http://sessions.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&ContentRecor
d_id=407148c1-19b9-b4b1-12ca-ebba8d945182&IsPrint=true.
13
Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile
Transaction,
64
FED. COMM. L.J. (forthcoming
2011),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1850103.
14
American Antitrust Institute, White Paper: The Effect of AT&T’s Acquisition of TMobile Is Likely to Substantially Lessen Competition (Aug. 2011), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/aai-white-paper-attt-mobile-merger.
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largest corporate donor (giving him $10,000 in 2009-10).15 AT&T gave
even more money to Shuler’s Political Action Committees (PACs).16 All
the other Democratic signatories received donations from AT&T as well.
On the Republican side, AT&T was Congressman Olson’s second largest
corporate donor (giving him $14,000 in 2009-10),17 with additional money
flowing to him through PACs. Bloomberg, in reviewing the campaign
finance records, found that 99 of the 100 Republican signatories received
political donations from AT&T’s PAC since 2009.18 In all, the Republicans
received $953,275 from AT&T’s Federal Political Action Committee.19 As
for the outspoken Congressman Pete Sessions, AT&T’s Federal PAC
hosted at least three fundraising dinners for him this year alone.20
But it is easy to attack the lobbyists, the companies that hire them, and
15

Center for Responsive Politics, Heath Shuler, Summary Data,
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.php?cid=N00027655&cycle=2010 (last
visited Sept. 29, 2011).
16
In the 2009-10 cycle, AT&T gave $9,000 to Shuler’s PAC, 3rd and Long, $10,000 to
the Blue Dog PAC (which gave in turn some of the proceeds to Shuler), and to other PACs
of which Shuler was a recipient.
Center for Responsive Politics, AT&T Inc.
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pac2pac.php?cycle=2010&cmte=C00109017 (last visited
Sept. 29, 2011).
17
Center
for
Responsive
Politics,
Pete
Olson,
Summary
Data,
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.php?cid=N00029285&cycle=2010 (last
visited Sept. 29, 2011).
18
Todd Shields & Jonathan D. Salant, AT&T Gave $963,275 to U.S. Lawmakers
Urging Approval of T-Mobile USA Deal, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 21, 2011, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-21/at-t-gave-963-275-to-lawmakers-urging-u-sapproval-of-t-mobile-purchase.html.
19
Martyn Griffen, AT&T Campaign Donations to Signatories of Sept. 20, 2011, House
Republican Letter, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/att-campaign-donation-information (examining campaign
donation data for 2009/10 and 2011/12).
20
One dinner was on September 20, 2011 at Ruth’s Chris Steakhouse (requesting
contributions of Co-Host $2500, PAC $1000, Personal $5000); the second dinner was on
July 27, 2011 at Bobby Vans Grille (requesting contributions of $2,500 PAC, $1,000
Personal); and the third was on June 23, 2011 at Ruth’s Chris Steakhouse (requesting
contributions of $2,500 PAC; $1,000 Personal). Copies of the invitations are available at
the
Sunlight
Foundation’s
Party
Time
website,
http://politicalpartytime.org/party/28825/#invite. AT&T also hosted a recent fundraiser for
Democratic Rep. Cardoza (suggested admittance $1000 PAC, $8500 Personal), available
at http://politicalpartytime.org/party/28825/#invite.
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the elected officials who respond to them. Lobbyists are not the problem.
Companies like AT&T and Google enjoy significant market power. They
spend money on lobbying because it makes economic sense. Lobbying can
affect the outcome.21 (Otherwise companies would not waste millions of
dollars annually on these expenditures.) Why does lobbying affect the
outcome? It is basic economics that the more discretion the government has
in bringing and determining antitrust violations, the more prone their
policies are to distortion by lobbyists. The vaguer the legal standard, the
more subjective input it allows from lobbyists. The less transparent the
antitrust review and its objectives, the less predictable the antitrust
enforcement becomes.
Consequently, the problem is not lobbyists.

The problem is the

combination of lax campaign finance rules and antitrust’s prevailing legal
standard. Recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have substantially
worsened the situation. In Citizens United, the limitations on corporate
political spending were substantially weakened, thereby vastly increasing
the importance of pleasing large donors in order to win elections.22 In
antitrust, the Court recently stated that the fact-specific rule of reason is the
21

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 966 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part).
22
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910. The Court found that
the appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose
faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech
presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. The fact that a
corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
In contrast, the dissenting justices found that
[g]oing forward, corporations and unions will be free to spend as much general
treasury money as they wish on ads that support or attack specific candidates, whereas
national parties will not be able to spend a dime of soft money on ads of any kind. The
Court's ruling thus dramatically enhances the role of corporations and unions-and the
narrow interests they represent-vis-à-vis the role of political parties-and the broad
coalitions they represent-in determining who will hold public office.
Id. at 940.
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“usual”23 and “accepted standard”24 for evaluating conduct under the
Sherman Act.25 This standard, as the courts have described, involves a
“flexible” factual inquiry into a restraint’s overall competitive effect and
“the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed.”26 The rule of reason also “varies in focus and
detail

depending

on

the

nature

of

the

agreement

and

market

circumstances.”27 Despite its label, the rule of reason is not a directive that
businesses and consumers can readily understand and internalize (such as
clear prohibitions on agreeing with one’s competitors to fix prices).
Instead, the term embraces antitrust’s most open-ended principles, making
prospective compliance with its requirements exceedingly difficult.28 The
Horizontal Merger Guidelines29 and section 7 case law bring merger review
somewhat closer to rule-of-law principles than the Court’s rule-of-reason
analysis. But both are sufficiently pliable to fatten lobbyists.
This flexibility in legal standards is attractive to testifying experts,
lobbyists, and antitrust counsel who “know” and “can work” with the FTC
and DOJ to get the merger through. It is far from desirable for corporate
executives who need to know what is legal or illegal, as well as customers
and competitors who need to know what is reasonable and unreasonable
competitive behavior.

23

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
Id. at 885.
25
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“Court presumptively applies rule of
reason analysis”).
26
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010) (quoting
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
27
Federal Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors § 1.2, at 4 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
28
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009).
29
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug.
19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
24
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So the recent antitrust activity is refreshing. But what would be
especially refreshing is if the courts provide clearer antitrust rules than its
current rule of reason.

Clearer standards on what is or is not permissible

will yield greater predictability, objectivity and transparency in antitrust
enforcement. While companies and customers would benefit, lobbyists
might have reason to complain.
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